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The Liberal Case Against  
the Modern Class Action 
Martin H. Redish* 
Those who classify themselves as liberal generally favor widespread use 
of class actions as a means of policing corporate misbehavior and protecting the 
individual worker or consumer against capitalist excesses. In this Essay, 
however, I take the counterintuitive position that while class action practice 
could conceivably be modified in ways that make it far more acceptable than it 
currently is, liberal political theory should be very skeptical of the modern class 
action device as it currently exists. Defining the foundation of liberal thought 
as a process-based belief in accountable democratic government and respect for 
the right of individuals to protect their rights by resort to the judicial process, I 
find that in all too many cases, the modern class action is substantially 
inconsistent with this liberal ideal. In their current form, class actions often 
serve as a means to deceptively alter existing substantive law through backdoor 




I.   WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE A “LIBERAL”? ........................ 1131 
II.   THE MODERN CLASS ACTION AND PROCESS-BASED 
LIBERALISM ....................................................................... 1134 
A.  The Political Pathology of Legislative  
 Deception ................................................................ 1134 
B.  How the Modern Class Action Alters the DNA of 
Underlying Substantive Law ................................. 1136 
 
 * Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern University 
Pritzker School of Law. The author would like to thank Catherine Cervone of the J.D. class of 2021 
at Northwestern for her extremely valuable research assistance. 
        
1128 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:4:1127 
C.  Mandatory Class Actions and Individualist 
Liberalism .............................................................. 1140 
D.  The Irony of the Liberal-Capitalist Critique of the 
Modern Class Action .............................................. 1142 
III.  THE DUBIOUS CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR THE MODERN  
  CLASS ACTION ................................................................... 1143 
CONCLUSION: THE DANGER OF RESULT-ORIENTED  
LIBERALISM .................................................................................. 1145 
INTRODUCTION 
It is hardly an overstatement that the modern class action is 
widely deemed by political liberals as an important weapon to police 
corporate misbehavior.1 Driven by a combination of a belief in pursuit 
of the common good and a strong profit motive, plaintiffs’ class action 
attorneys mount powerful attacks on equally powerful corporate 
entities. Although one can seriously debate the individual merits of 
each of these legal challenges, it is reasonable to assume that the liberal 
agenda is generally furthered by the redistribution of wealth and the 
penalization of corporate legal wrongdoing. In contrast, it is equally 
reasonable to assume that, on the whole, political conservatives are 
seriously troubled by what they deem the “legalized blackmail” that 
results from many modern class actions.2  
The Conservative Case for Class Actions, the recently published, 
thoughtful, and provocative book by Professor Brian Fitzpatrick, 
challenges this standard division.3 Fitzpatrick suggests that 
conservatives should actually favor the use of class actions for a variety 
of interesting (and controversial) reasons.4 In this Essay, I seek to 
accomplish two goals. First, using Professor Fitzpatrick’s work as a 
form of reverse inspiration, I seek to fashion a mirror image argument—
one that is equally out of the ordinary. I will make the liberal case 
against the modern class action. Second, I raise serious doubts about 
the logic employed by Fitzpatrick in concluding that conservatives 
should favor the use of class actions. To be sure, in critiquing the 
 
 1. See Daniel Fisher, Are Class Actions Unconstitutional?, FORBES (Feb. 8, 2010), 
https://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0208/opinions-law-constitution-courts-ideas-opinions.html# 
36706cd81751 [https://perma.cc/7TL6-SE86] (“[Class action] lawyers say the class action is an 
indispensable tool for disciplining corporations run amok.”). 
 2. For a discussion of the class action as legalized blackmail, see generally Bruce Hay & 
David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 
75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377 (2000). 
 3. BRIAN T. FITZPATRICK, THE CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR CLASS ACTIONS (2019). 
 4. See infra Part III. 
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conservative case for the class action, I am in uncharted territory. 
Unlike Fitzpatrick, I do not begin with the assumption of a conservative 
perspective. But assuming, solely for purposes of argument, that we are 
seeking to further conservative values, I am mystified by Professor 
Fitzpatrick’s conclusion. To the extent conservatives are willing to 
accept any form of regulation in place of the invisible hand of the 
market, I cannot imagine how they would prefer the self-interested, 
unpredictable form of regulation implemented by the modern class 
action, whatever their reservations about direct governmental 
regulation. 
This Essay is divided into three parts. In Part I, I devote 
substantial attention to defining the term “liberal.” One can only make 
a coherent liberal case against the modern class action if one explains 
what is meant by “liberal.” And my definition may not be the same as 
everyone else’s. As I explain, I define liberal as a form of governmental 
process that has a commitment to consent of the governed as its 
foundation. This foundational premise in turn leads to an instrumental 
commitment (at least on subconstitutional issues) to rule solely by those 
representative of and accountable to the electorate.5 This commitment 
requires that voters be able to judge their elected officials by how they 
vote on legislation that matters to them. 
This process-based understanding of liberalism differs from the 
more substantive version, which identifies as “liberal” a set of 
substantive goals and values largely agreed upon by most who refer to 
themselves as liberal: Medicare for all (or, perhaps, all who need it), 
concern over climate change, recognition of a need for gun control, 
avoidance of endless wars, etc. But forced imposition of a set of so-called 
liberal goals on an unwilling electorate would give rise to an untenable 
theoretical oxymoron: a form of fascist liberalism. Hence, while we can 
debate what substantive goals and programs are or are not “liberal,” 
the foundational necessary condition for a commitment to liberalism is 
an overriding recognition of rule by the people and respect for the 
individual’s role in helping to influence governmental policies.6 
Recognition of the essentially process-based nature of liberalism 
leads to Part II of this Essay, which fashions a process-based attack on 
the modern class action.7 This attack, I should emphasize, is not aimed 
at the abstract concept of a class action. Nor does it necessarily focus on 
 
 5. See infra Part I. 
 6. Professor Fitzpatrick’s responding essay expresses confusion as to how I am able to 
characterize my critique of the modern class action as “liberal.” Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Why Class 
Actions Are Something both Liberals and Conservatives Can Love, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1147, 1147 
(2020). In response, all I can do is urge him to reread the above paragraph. 
 7. See infra Part II. 
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all class actions. The point, rather, is that as presently structured, the 
class action device either requires or permits forms of multiparty 
representative litigation that seriously threaten core notions of process-
based liberalism. Mandatory classes8 and opt-out inclusion9 also raise 
serious concerns from the perspective of process-based liberalism.  
Of greatest concern, however, is the problem of what I refer to 
as the “faux” class action.10 In such proceedings, most of the class 
members are little more than cardboard cutouts of actual class 
members. To be sure, the class members actually exist. But because of 
the relatively small value of the claims and the often considerable 
difficulty in identifying class members, the likelihood that they will ever 
be aware they are class members, much less actually recover for the 
harm they suffered, is very small. But this problem fails to prevent class 
certification. Either through adjudication or (more likely) settlement, 
the suit is resolved, the defendants “compensate” as if all class members 
will receive the money due them, and class attorneys are compensated 
by reference to the full amount awarded. 
What happens to the often significant amount of money left over 
after class members are given the opportunity to recover? In recent 
years, it has been donated to some deserving charity under a doctrine 
known as cy pres—derived from a French phrase meaning “second 
best.” The problem, however, is that the charity has never been injured 
by the defendants, and the only compensatory method authorized by 
the underlying substantive law—usually, state or federal statutes—is 
compensation to the injured victims. This perversion of the underlying 
law being enforced through resort to a backdoor procedural shell game 
takes place without the voters being aware of the fundamental change 
in the DNA of the laws on which their legislators voted. Is there a big 
difference between a legislator voting for a law that requires 
wrongdoers to compensate those whom they injured on the one hand 
and a law requiring wrongdoers to pay uninjured attorneys and 
uninjured charities? You bet there is—or, at least, there may well be. 
Yet through the purely procedural device of a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure, the underlying essence of the substantive law being enforced 
is significantly transformed. This, I submit, represents a serious threat 
to the foundations of the democratic process: representativeness and 
accountability of those chosen by the people to enact laws impacting 
 
 8. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)–(2). 
 9. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 10. See MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE 
PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 24 (2009) (“[I]n [faux class actions], as a practical matter, 
it is the private attorneys who initiate suit and who are the only ones rewarded for exposing the 
defendants’ law violations.”). 
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social or economic behavior. In effect, it amounts to a form of legislative 
deception—most assuredly giving rise to a pathological threat to 
democracy. In Part II, I elaborate on both the nature of process-based 
liberalism in a democratic society and the manner in which the modern 
class action, in all too many cases, presents a serious threat to those 
process-based values by altering the fundamental remedial scheme 
expressly enacted by an authorized legislative body. 
In Part III, I assume the hypothetical (and unfamiliar) role of a 
conservative. Through a conservative’s eyes, I examine Professor 
Fitzpatrick’s arguments as to why my conservative self should welcome 
the modern class action as perhaps the least of all possible regulatory 
evils.11 Professor Fitzpatrick acknowledges the need to deter corporate 
misdeeds—something on which he and liberals can comfortably agree. 
Yet, my conservative reaction to these arguments is, at best, one of 
skepticism. If a conservative believes that some or even all 
governmental regulation is improper or ill-advised as an interference 
with the free market, then I cannot imagine why he or she should prefer 
the often Wild West–like, self-interested clash or bargains between 
profit-motivated plaintiffs’ lawyers and large companies. The results 
are likely to amount either to too much or too little regulation. If 
somehow the strategic game of chess between these two actually 
amounts to just the right amount of regulation, it will be through no 
fault of logic or reason.  
Professor Fitzpatrick himself seems to acknowledge the serious 
problems that plague the modern class action, since he proposes 
significant, even dramatic alterations to the procedural device. I agree 
with many of these suggested reforms. But if he is suggesting that even 
absent implementation of such reforms the modern class action remains 
the best regulatory alternative, I believe both my true liberal self and 
my hypothetical conservative self would be forced to disagree with him. 
I. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE A “LIBERAL”? 
One, of course, cannot rationally claim to be fashioning a liberal 
attack on the modern class action without first defining what one means 
by “liberal.” If one were to survey one thousand well-educated 
individuals who consider themselves to be liberal, one would likely 
receive responses that consisted primarily, if not exclusively, of a list of 
specific political and social programs: gun control, universal health 
care, increased protections and opportunities for racial minorities, 
tolerance of diverse sexual preferences, and so on. It would be difficult 
 
 11. See infra Part III. 
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to argue with such responses, at least as a matter of modern-day 
politics. But what if these same individuals were asked whether an 
unrepresentative, unaccountable, unelected dictatorial government 
could be deemed “liberal” if it imposed such programs by fiat on an 
unwilling society? Hardly. One could arguably believe that support for 
the substantive progressive political platform constitutes a necessary 
condition for liberalism, but surely it cannot be deemed a sufficient 
condition. An equally necessary condition for liberalism, I submit, is a 
government chosen by and accountable to the people. To be sure, a wise 
democratic government will likely establish some form of 
countermajoritarian constitutional limitation on majoritarian power, 
much as our own society has done. But if so, as I have argued in prior 
writing, it is for the paradoxical reason that accountable democratic 
government can only be preserved by imposition of some form of 
regulation that is insulated from democratic rule.12 
It is important to distinguish liberalism from such leftist 
programs as socialism or communism. Indeed, the well-known liberal 
organization, Americans for Democratic Action, was formed in the 
1940s as an alternative to the expansion of the American Communist 
Party.13 The organization’s famous founders rejected communism, 
primarily because of its failure to require a democratically accountable 
form of government.14 
The modern political philosopher most associated with liberal 
thought, John Rawls, has likewise focused on the existence of a truly 
representative form of government as the essence of liberal political 
philosophy. In his most famous work, A Theory of Justice, Rawls adopts 
what he call his “First Principle,” which mandates that “[e]ach person 
is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal 
basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.”15 
Rawls includes within the concept of basic liberty such foundational 
freedoms as the right to vote, the rights of freedom of speech and 
assembly, the liberty of conscience, and freedom of thought.16 These are 
the key rights designed to enable citizens to develop and exercise their 
 
 12. See generally MARTIN H. REDISH, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION: A DEMOCRATIC PARADOX (2017) (arguing that the American constitutional 
democratic system can only function effectively with vigilant enforcement of judicial 
independence). 
 13. See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE LOGIC OF PERSECUTION: FREE EXPRESSION AND THE 
MCCARTHY ERA 14 (2005). 
 14. See id. (“Americans for Democratic Action, an organization that had been founded by 
many of the leading liberals of the period, expressly excluded communists from membership.”). 
 15. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 250 (reprt. ed. 2005). 
 16. Id. at 61. 
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intellectual and moral powers and to judge society and its policies.17 In 
his later work, Rawls recast his definition of a fully adequate scheme of 
equal basic liberties in political terms, including such liberties as 
political liberties, freedom of association, freedoms specified by the 
liberty and integrity of the person, and rights and liberties covered by 
the rule of law.18 
It is important to distinguish this rights-based form of liberal 
political theory from the modern political philosophy of libertarianism. 
It is true that any legitimate form of libertarianism would likely include 
a process-based mode of liberalism. But libertarianism generally goes 
much further, including within its protective reach such substantive 
liberties as economic freedom, freedom to bear arms, or freedom to use 
drugs. Process-based liberalism is best described as a form of meta-
libertarianism—the liberty to participate in the process of liberty. It is 
this form of liberty that is essential to the continued viability of a 
constitutional democracy. It is to be distinguished from substantive 
libertarianism—the rights to use drugs, not to wear crash helmets, or 
to own guns, for example. One may or may not accept those rights as a 
legal or normative matter; that is an issue for another day. Rather, it is 
those liberties directly involved in the continued operation of the 
democratic process which liberal theory necessarily embraces. 
With this foundational understanding of the core notions of 
liberal political theory now established, it is possible to test the modern 
class action against it. As the following Part shows, while the abstract 
concept of the class action is not necessarily inconsistent with political 
liberalism, both the manner in which it has been formally shaped and 
the manner in which it has functioned in the real world all too often 
raise serious concerns from the perspective of liberal values. And the 
irony of this fact should not be lost. Today, most in the legal world who 
describe themselves as liberal strongly support widespread use of the 
modern class action, because it serves as an effective check on the 
illegality of corporate behavior. Regulation of big business to assure 
compliance with law and to protect otherwise defenseless individuals 
against corporate power, it is safe to say, is central to the modern 
substantive liberal political agenda. But in seeking to achieve this end, 
the modern class action too often undermines core notions of 
representative and accountable government and, therefore, the 
foundational premises of process-based liberalism.  
 
 17. See id. 
 18. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 310–34 (1993). 
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II. THE MODERN CLASS ACTION AND PROCESS-BASED LIBERALISM 
At the outset, it is important to emphasize that the class action, 
in the abstract, is not inherently inconsistent with political liberalism. 
A complex procedural aggregation device that enables plaintiffs 
possessing parallel claims or claims arising out of the same allegedly 
illegal behavior by the same defendant or group of defendants is 
pragmatically attractive and consistent with the promotion of 
substantive justice and the rule of law. Too often, however, the system 
has been corrupted in pathological ways, either because Rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly requires this result or 
because Rule 23 fails to protect against it. 
The ways in which the modern class action threatens or 
undermines liberal political values can be grouped under two broad 
headings: (1) legislative deception19 and (2) corrupted individualism. 
The former operates on a macro level, since it negatively impacts 
democratic society as a whole, while the latter functions on a micro 
level, because its pathological impact is on the individual citizen’s 
ability to exercise his or her meta-liberty to participate in the 
democratic governmental processes as a means of furthering or 
protecting his or her interests. 
A. The Political Pathology of Legislative Deception 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are just that—rules of 
procedure, and nothing more. They are promulgated pursuant to, and 
limited by, the Rules Enabling Act, which restricts them by expressly 
prohibiting them from abridging, enlarging, or modifying a substantive 
right.20 The most likely reason for this congressionally imposed 
limitation is the core premise of liberal democracy, the accountability of 
those who govern to those whom they were elected to represent. We do 
not allow legislators to cast secret ballots, for example, because our 
system operates on the assumption that the voters determine whether 
they wish to retain their elected representatives, at least in part, on 
whether they agree with how those representatives voted on particular 
pieces of legislation.  
 
 19. See generally Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative Deception, 
Separation of Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of United States 
v. Klein, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 437 (2006) (describing the precept of American political theory that 
“the judiciary has the constitutional power and obligation to assure that Congress has not deceived 
the electorate as to the manner in which its legislation actually alters the preexisting legal, 
political, social, or economic topography”). 
 20. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). 
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Of course, not every voter will care about every, or even most, 
legislative votes cast by their elected representatives. But it would be 
dangerous and wrongheaded to casually dismiss the notion of 
democratic accountability. Much like advertising, where it is often said 
that half of advertising is useless but no one knows which half,21 it is 
likely that some voters care about some bills and it is effectively 
impossible to determine, either ex ante or ex post, which bills which 
voters care about. For example, surely there are voters who care about 
how their representatives vote on bills concerning women’s 
reproductive rights, or the environment, or how unions are treated, or 
how religious institutions are dealt with. But even on less well-known 
or controversial legislative proposals, there may well be pockets of 
voters who are members of interest groups that care about each one. 
Because there is no feasible way for any of us to determine which bills 
voters care about and which they do not, it is essential for us to assume 
that some voters care about each one. It is therefore essential, for 
representative liberal democracy to function properly, that substantive 
legislation be implemented and enforced in the manner contemplated 
in and directed by what is contained in the four corners of the statute. 
To be sure, issues of textual interpretation will on occasion arise over 
which reasonable people will differ. But it is certain that a law which 
provides “X” cannot properly be judicially construed to mean “Y,” or “not 
X.” To do so would amount to a backdoor judicial manipulation of the 
substance of the law enacted by the people’s elected representatives. 
Just as importantly, it would amount to a serious subversion of 
representative democracy, because the electorate will be misled as to 
what the controlling law actually is. Even more troubling is that the 
substantive law duly enacted by the people’s representatives will have 
been distorted by those whose job it was to faithfully implement it. 
Every legislatively enacted substantive prohibition on or 
regulation of citizens’ primary behavior22 necessarily contains within it 
two elements: the proscriptive and the remedial. The former describes 
the prohibited or regulated behavior, and the latter refers to the 
penalties or negative consequences that flow from a violation of the 
behavioral proscription. Both elements represent inherent parts of the 
 
 21. John Wanamaker famously claimed, “Half the money I spend on advertising is wasted; 
the trouble is I don’t know which half.” See John Wanamaker, QUOTATIONS PAGE, 
http://www.quotationspage.com/quotes/John_Wanamaker/ (last visited May 7, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/4TPY-EH4X]. 
 22. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing HENRY M. 
HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 678 (1953)) 
(arguing substantive laws are those which affect “primary decisions respecting human conduct”). 
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substantive law which either Congress or a state legislature has 
enacted. 
A legislative body has a variety of alternatives available to it in 
shaping a remedial model. It can choose from permutations or 
combinations of a number of conceivable penalties for violation of a 
substantive behavioral proscription: criminal conviction, civil fines, 
administrative penalization, or an award of compensatory damages. A 
legislature can also choose to establish a form of qui tam remedy, as it 
has in the current whistleblower statute, the False Claims Act.23 Under 
this framework, an uninjured party may be compensated for choosing 
to pursue a valid specified civil claim against a culpable defendant.24  
A backdoor judicial alteration in the DNA of either the 
proscriptive or the remedial elements of legislation is properly viewed 
as a serious undermining of liberal democratic institutions. Voters may 
well care as much about the remedial as the proscriptive elements. For 
example, whether a law imposes a penalty of life imprisonment or a 
slap-on-the-wrist civil fine may well be the subject of political debate. 
Similarly, imposition on corporate wrongdoers of an obligation to 
compensate injured victims may well be far more palatable to the voters 
than requiring those wrongdoers to do nothing more than pay large 
amounts to uninjured plaintiffs’ lawyers, or even to uninjured charities 
only tangentially or remotely related to the unlawful harm committed. 
Thus, for a procedural mechanism like the class action to 
surreptitiously convert a legislative scheme designed to compensate 
injured victims into a form of indirect civil fine or qui tam structure 
constitutes a serious distortion of liberal democracy. 
B. How the Modern Class Action Alters the  
DNA of Underlying Substantive Law 
Though I have already made the point multiple times, it is worth 
reiterating it at this point: I am not suggesting that all class actions 
inherently undermine or distort the underlying substantive law being 
enforced. My point, rather, is that all too often, that is exactly the case. 
In order to prove this point, the place to begin is with Professor 
John Coffee’s taxonomy of the modern class action. A number of years 
ago, Professor Coffee divided the modern class action into three 
 
 23. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, 3730(b) (2012). 
 24. Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the 
Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 81; see also Vermont 
Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774 (2000) (noting “the long 
tradition of qui tam actions in England and the American Colonies”). 
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categories, “Type A,” “Type B,” and “Type C” class actions.25 Type A 
class actions are those in which the individual claims of the class 
members are sufficiently large in amount that if there were no class 
action, they could be brought as viable individual claims.26 In other 
words, these claims are of an amount sufficient to justify an attorney’s 
time in pursuing them on their own. They are what can be called 
“positive value” claims. Type B claims, or “negative value” claims, are 
not sufficiently large to justify individual suits.27 “Type C” claims, 
according to Coffee, involve a mixture of Type A and Type B claims.28  
While Professor Coffee’s trichotomy is valuable for its structural 
insights, his categorizations omit a very important category of claims: 
those that are so small that they cannot stand on their own and it 
simply is not worth the cost for claimants even to bother to file a claim 
or for the attorneys to find the claimants. Classes predominantly made 
up of claims falling into this fourth category, I believe, are appropriately 
labeled “faux” class actions.29 They amount to a cardboard cutout of a 
real class: from a distance, it looks like a real class, but upon closer 
examination it is seen not to be real. The claimants are, in an important 
sense, comatose: not only do they fail to stand on their own, but also it 
is simply not worth the cost for claimants even to file a claim or for the 
attorneys to attempt to find the claimants.30 Alternatively, many who 
fall within the class’s description are difficult to ascertain, either in 
name or location.31 Yet the amount of any award or settlement and, in 
turn, the fee amount awarded to class attorneys, will be determined on 
the basis of the size of this faux class. Obviously, a significant portion 
of the total amount awarded will go unclaimed. The underlying 
substantive law being enforced, which dictates that the remedy for 
violation be compensation of those injured, will have been ignored. And 
everyone involved, from the moment the class was certified, will know 
this.  
What happens to the unclaimed funds, which are often of a very 
significant amount? Theoretically, one could persuasively argue that 
they should be returned to the defendant: the defendant’s obligation 
under controlling substantive law is solely to compensate injured 
 
 25. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and 
Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 904–06 (1987). 
 26. Id. at 904–05. 
 27. Id. at 905. 
 28. Id. at 905–06. 
 29. See generally Redish, supra note 24 (explaining “faux” class actions as those where the 
bulk of the class members have claims so small that it will effectively be impossible to compensate 
them). 
 30. REDISH, supra note 10, at 24. 
 31. Id. at 24–25. 
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victims, and unless and until those victims can be discovered, there is 
no basis on which to take money from the defendant. The optics of this 
result, however, are obviously bad, and I am unaware of any situation 
where this course of action was adopted. Rather, from the very 
beginning of the process, everyone involved is aware that the money 
will either escheat to the state or, more likely, be awarded to a charity 
that supposedly is related in some way—no matter how attenuated—to 
the subject of the suit.32 No one seems to care that the charity has not 
been injured in any way and, indeed, has absolutely nothing to do with 
either the lawsuit or the events that gave rise to that lawsuit.  
This form of remedy is known as cy pres, derived from a French 
phrase that means “the second best” or “the best possible.”33 As a legal 
concept, cy pres developed in the law of trusts and estates, having 
nothing to do with litigation. In the early 1970s, however, courts—in an 
attempt to insert the proverbial square peg into a round hole—began to 
borrow the concept for the context of litigation.34 Courts did so under 
the auspices of Rule 23 alone; no substantive statute being enforced in 
the class proceeding made even the slightest reference to such a form of 
supposedly “second best” remedy.35 To the contrary, those laws provide 
solely for compensation to the victims. Yet by enforcing a procedural 
rule, the courts—with the encouragement of plaintiffs’ lawyers and 
often even defendants’ lawyers36—effectively perform the legal 
equivalent of transforming straw into gold by changing the DNA of the 
underlying substantive law properly enacted through the democratic 
process. 
Such a practice should be held unconstitutional as a violation of 
separation of powers: courts have absolutely no authority to alter, 
ignore, or transform constitutionally valid substantive legislation. One 
likely need not reach that constitutional issue, however, because the 
practice obviously violates the unambiguous directive of the Rules 
Enabling Act that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure “not abridge, 
enlarge or modify [a] substantive right.”37 If Rule 23 were to be 
construed to enable a court to ignore or transform the remedial element 
of a substantive law being enforced in a class proceeding, Rule 23 would 
violate that legislative directive. A Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is 
 
 32. Martin H. Redish, Peter Julian & Samantha Zyontz, Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies 
of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 617, 649 (2010). 
 33. See id. at 624. 
 34. See id.  
 35. See id. at 624, 634–35.  
 36. Defendants’ lawyers have often concurred in the court’s resort to cy pres as part of their 
effort to obtain a settlement with the plaintiff class. 
 37. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012). 
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just that—a procedural rule. It is simply too small a tail to wag such a 
large dog.38 
From the perspective of process-based liberalism,39 such 
backdoor procedural manipulation of underlying substantive law 
pathologically undermines core premises of representative democracy. 
Democratic institutions have chosen to enact into law a specific form of 
remedy: compensation for victims. And without even intimating that 
such a remedial model is unconstitutional, courts transform the law to 
create a perverse combination of civil fine and qui tam relief. It involves 
a civil fine because while the defendant is required to suffer a financial 
penalty, some of the money it pays goes to a wholly uninjured party. It 
is the equivalent of a court fining a defendant and directing her to pay 
the money to the Red Cross. It smacks of qui tam, because plaintiffs’ 
attorneys receive significant compensation for no reason other than 
they pursued the case, even though truly injured parties remain 
uncompensated for the most part. 
Would the public likely care about this perversion of the 
explicitly directed remedial model? I suppose one could debate the 
answer. On the one hand, many who consider themselves to be liberal 
would likely endorse the result, because their goal would be primarily 
to police and control illegal corporate behavior. But there is no doubt 
that many members of the public are not fans of plaintiff class action 
attorneys, rightly or wrongly. If the underlying substantive law had 
explicitly provided that the result of a class proceeding would be that 
true victims would not be compensated but instead plaintiff class 
attorneys would receive significant amounts of the penalty imposed on 
defendants, it is by no means clear that the public would have supported 
 
 38. More recently, some courts, possibly pressured by the widespread attacks on cy pres, have 
shifted to an alternative method of dealing with unclaimed funds: distributing unclaimed funds 
among those claimants who did in fact file. The American Law Institute has proposed distribution 
of undistributed funds in this manner. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION 
§ 3.07(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2019): 
If the settlement involves individual distributions to class members and funds remain 
after distributions . . . the settlement should presumptively provide for further 
distributions to participating class members unless the amounts involved are too small 
to make individual distributions economically viable or other specific reasons exist that 
would make such further distributions impossible or unfair. 
But in many cases, this alternative will be almost as problematic as cy pres. While these plaintiffs 
have presumably been injured, their injuries are limited to the actual loss suffered (perhaps 
augmented by treble damage awards or punitive damage awards, depending on the specific 
substantive law being invoked). But surely they have not been injured in the absurdly large 
amounts that could potentially be bestowed on them. And those excess amounts are available 
solely because other claimants have not been compensated. Such an approach views class members 
not as individuals deserving of justice, but rather as faceless, fungible masses. 
 39. See discussion supra Part I (discussing process-based liberalism and its place within 
theories of political liberalism). 
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such a law. At the very least, we cannot be certain one way or the other. 
The result of the process in such faux class actions, then, constitutes an 
unambiguous perversion of the essence of liberal democracy. 
I should emphasize once again that by no means do all modern 
class actions fall within the faux category I have described. Classes that 
qualify as what Professor Coffee referred to as Type A classes40 would 
not fall within the faux category, because the amounts of the individual 
claims are, by definition, sufficiently large to justify individual suit. 
Class members are therefore almost certainly going to be interested in 
and aware of the class proceeding that will determine their rights. Even 
Type B claims, where the individual claims are insufficient to justify 
individual suit, may escape the faux label where, due to the 
circumstances of the situation, class members are relatively easily 
ascertainable. But it would be incorrect to assume that the large 
majority of modern class actions are not faux class actions. They remain 
a significant problem for process-based liberal democracy. 
Is there a means to avoid faux classes? It would be extremely 
easy to do so. We could simply add to Rule 23(a) the requirement that 
before a class may be certified, named plaintiffs establish that 
“meaningful relief” could be given to the members of the class. Choice 
of the standard “meaningful relief” intentionally implies some room for 
judicial discretion. Rarely will a class be either clearly faux or not faux. 
In most instances, a certain portion of the class is likely to be interested 
or ascertainable and compensated with relative ease. It would be up to 
the court to determine, on the basis of the showing made by plaintiffs’ 
attorneys, whether a significantly large portion of the class is likely to 
be compensated. But where the percentage of compensated class 
members is likely in the single digits, the class most surely should not 
be certified. For reasons I am unable to grasp, however, the Rules 
Advisory Committee appears unwilling to even consider the propriety 
of such an amendment to Rule 23(a). 
C. Mandatory Class Actions and Individualist Liberalism 
Commitment to democracy may fall within a variety of forms. A 
communitarian form of democracy, for example, places relatively little 
emphasis on the rights of the individual member of society. Rather, its 
primary concern is with maintaining the community’s ability to self-
determine.41 But it is my belief that a truly liberal form of democracy is 
 
 40. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text. 
 41. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS 
OF THE PEOPLE (1960). 
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properly grounded in a moral commitment to the worth of the individual 
member of society as an integral whole, worthy of respect and fair 
treatment. It should be noted once again that such a commitment to 
individualist liberalism is by no means the same thing as a commitment 
to modern libertarianism. Rather, it represents only acceptance of 
meta-libertarianism—that is, the right to participate freely in the 
processes of liberty. Thus, individualist liberalism concerns the freedom 
of the individual to participate in the process of choosing those who 
govern, and in petitioning the government for rulings or legislation that 
will advance the individual’s moral beliefs or personal interests. While 
this is not the time or place to justify a choice in favor of liberal 
democracy over communitarian democracy, it is worth noting the 
communitarian’s failure to recognize the obvious: the fact that the 
community is made up of individuals.42 For present purposes, it is 
sufficient to establish that process-based liberalism necessarily 
includes recognition of the individual citizen’s worth and value, as well 
as the individual citizen’s role in choosing and petitioning those who 
govern. 
In a number of situations, the modern class action (even in 
contexts other than the faux class action) contravenes core notions of 
liberalism. Rule 23(b) creates four categories of class actions, and three 
of them establish mandatory classes.43 A “mandatory” class prohibits 
all class members from removing themselves from the class, even if they 
fervently wish to do so. As a result, individual class members’ rights are 
to be litigated by class counsel as chosen by the court,44 even if they 
wish to use only their own lawyer with a totally different legal strategy. 
This is of course an especially serious problem in Type A classes, where 
the individual claims are often substantial. By paternalistically forcing 
individual class members to litigate their claims only as part of a large 
group without any realistic opportunity to control the manner of 
litigation, mandatory classes violate due process and are therefore 
unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court has never ruled on the due process challenge 
to mandatory classes.45 It has conspicuously construed the mandatory 
 
 42. For a detailed examination of the alternative theories of democracy, including adversary 
democracy, see MARTIN H. REDISH, THE ADVERSARY FIRST AMENDMENT: FREE EXPRESSION AND 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2013). 
 43. The three categories of mandatory classes are Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
23(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), and (b)(2). A detailed discussion of the substance of the Rule 23(b) categories 
is beyond the scope of this essay. For a detailed explanation of these categories in this context, see 
REDISH, supra note 10, at 135–75. 
 44. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1). 
 45. At one point the Court did agree to consider the issue, but ultimately dismissed certiorari 
as having been improvidently granted. See Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 
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categories in a narrow manner, however, likely because of the Justices’ 
unease with such a constitutionally questionable frontal assault on 
litigant autonomy.46 
D. The Irony of the Liberal-Capitalist Critique of  
the Modern Class Action 
In prior scholarship, I proposed as the proper theoretical 
rationale of the modern class action what I called the “guardianship 
model.”47 Under this framework, class attorneys are properly viewed as 
the guardians of the interests of passive class members who have 
allegedly been injured by a corporate defendant.48 In so doing, they can 
reasonably be deemed to be furthering liberal values by protecting the 
interests of the little person against potential corporate bullies. But 
ironically, the guardians’ motivation will often be—at least in 
significant part—grounded in a capitalist-driven profit motivation.  
There is nothing inherently wrong with this; people should be 
allowed to do well by doing good. However, if economic externalities are 
allowed to pervert those capitalistic incentives, then the liberal interest 
in protecting vulnerable individuals is easily and dangerously 
subverted. And the modern class action is plagued with such 
externalities. Indeed, the very fact that class attorneys are 
compensated by reference to the amount awarded to the class as a 
whole, rather than with reference to the amount actually paid to class 
members, reduces class attorney incentives to locate and compensate 
individual class members. Equally threatening to the capitalistic 
incentives supposedly driving class attorneys is the very existence of cy 
pres relief.49 
The easiest way to preserve the process-based values of 
liberalism, ironically, is to measure the validity of any class action 
procedure by whether it furthers or reduces the capitalistic profit 
incentive of class attorneys to protect the interests of real plaintiff class 
members. All too often, the modern class action fails this paradoxical 
capitalistic test of process-based liberalism. 
 
1992) (holding that due process required an opportunity for plaintiff to remove himself from the 
class where forum court had personal jurisdiction over plaintiff), cert. granted in part, 510 U.S. 
810 (1993), cert. dismissed per curiam as improvidently granted, 511 U.S. 117 (1994).  
 46. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011) (construing narrowly 
Rule 23(b)(2)); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 845 (1999) (construing narrowly Rule 
23(b)(1)(B)). 
 47. Martin H. Redish, Rethinking the Theory of the Class Action: The Risks and Rewards of 
Capitalistic Socialism in the Litigation Process, 64 EMORY L.J. 451, 453 (2014). 
 48. Id. 
 49. See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text.  
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III. THE DUBIOUS CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR  
THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 
I am hardly the one to critique the conservative case for class 
actions, in light of the fact that, at least on a political level, I most 
certainly would never describe myself as a conservative. Nevertheless, 
if I were to begin my normative analysis by assuming the validity of 
what I understand to be basic conservative political values, I must say 
I am puzzled by any sympathy a conservative would have for modern 
class procedures.  
Perhaps the argument is grounded in a sort of zero-sum game. 
Conservatives generally believe in the wisdom of the market, and that 
belief is accompanied by mistrust of government. Because conservatives 
dislike direct governmental regulation, they might choose to reject such 
regulatory programs in favor of the more indirect regulation imposed 
by the class action. The first problem with such reasoning, of course, is 
the assumption that regulation is a zero-sum game. The mere fact that 
one chooses to reject direct regulation does not necessarily imply 
acceptance of regulation through class actions. And one should never 
forget that the regulation imposed by class actions is an important form 
of governmental regulation. The laws being enforced are generally 
enacted by the legislative branch of government, and those laws are 
being enforced by yet another branch, the judiciary. A conservative 
could, then, just as easily reject all forms of governmental regulation, 
preferring instead to place almost full reliance on the market, with the 
assistance of individual litigations to enforce substantive legislative 
regulation.  
Conservatives might well argue that regulators are inherently 
biased in favor of regulation, because, after all, that is their job. I myself 
have raised such concerns in the context of a procedural due process 
analysis.50 But is it preferable, from the conservative perspective, to 
have regulation imposed through the efforts of financially incentivized 
private class action attorneys, motivated not by neutrality but 
primarily, if not exclusively, by personal profit? To be sure, in the 
abstract, conservatives strongly believe in profit-incentivized activity; 
that, after all, is the theory of the market. But surely we do not desire 
adjudicators—required by due process to be neutral51—to be 
 
 50. Martin H. Redish & Kristin McCall, Due Process, Free Expression, and the Administrative 
State, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 297, 312–13 (2018). 
 51. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) (“Every procedure which would offer a possible 
temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the 
defendant . . . denies the latter due process of law.”). See generally Martin H. Redish & Lawrence 
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incentivized by profit, which is to be determined solely on the basis of 
which side wins. And these private class action attorneys are 
empowered with the legal equivalent of a nuclear weapon: what some 
refer to as a form of legalized extortion—a “bet the company” class 
action.52 As a result, the resolution of the suit is generally not through 
reasoned judicial decision but by settlement. Moreover, while Rule 23 
requires judicial approval of all class settlements,53 it would probably 
not be unfair to suggest that all too often, class actions end with either 
regulation by intimidation (where defendants feel forced to settle 
because the risks of litigation are just too great) or by collusion (where 
defendants and plaintiffs end in suspicious agreement). It is, then, 
difficult to understand why a conservative would prefer such a “Wild 
West” form of unpredictable regulation that, of course, takes place only 
after substantial injuries may have been suffered, perhaps due to the 
absence of pre-injury governmental regulation. 
Professor Fitzpatrick, as a conservative, favors class actions for 
much the same reason that substantive liberals do: because they deter 
corporate misbehavior.54 But they also may distort the market in 
pathological ways. For example, they may actually overdeter. 
Corporations may be chilled from marketing beneficial products, for 
fear of the dangers of class actions brought for no reason other than 
profit motivation. There will be situations where a class action lacks 
merit, but its very threat shapes corporate behavior in perverse ways. 
More importantly, neither Professor Fitzpatrick nor any of his 
conservative comrades who endorse class actions (how many there are, 
I do not know) have responded to the alchemy of the modern class 
action: transforming a compensatory remedial model in a substantive 
statute into an entirely different, noncompensatory remedial model. 
The natural response of both liberals and conservatives who 
support class actions is to ask rhetorically, isn’t it better to provide some 
relief than none at all? Isn’t it better at least to achieve corporate 
deterrence, even if we are not able to provide meaningful compensation 
to the large (often very large) majority of class members? The problem 
with this nakedly utilitarian argument is that the Rules Enabling Act 
does not provide that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure may not enlarge, 
modify, or abridge a substantive right unless there is a really good 
pragmatic reason to do so. Rather, the statute unqualifiedly prohibits 
 
C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 
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 52. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1297–99 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting the 
“intense pressure to settle” caused by the filing of a class action). 
 53. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
 54. FITZPATRICK, supra note 3, at 99–113. 
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any such activity by a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.55 In this context, 
it must once again be emphasized that a lawsuit does not “arise under” 
Rule 23; that is nothing more than a rule of procedure. Rather, the suit 
arises under the underlying substantive law being invoked. More 
importantly, this solution swims fatally halfway across a river. To allow 
courts to selectively enforce only part of a law inevitably transforms 
that law into something for which those accountable to the electorate 
never voted. If those laws turn out to be ineffective means of achieving 
their intended ends, then in our constitutional democracy it is up to the 
political branches to reshape them. It cannot be achieved through the 
alternative method of resorting to a cynical procedural shell game. 
The most noteworthy aspect of Professor Fitzpatrick’s 
endorsement of class actions, however, is the numerous qualifiers which 
he attaches to his support. Towards the close of his book, Professor 
Fitzpatrick suggests numerous means of reforming the class action—
many of which (for example, limiting class attorney compensation to a 
percentage of the amount actually claimed, rather than the amount 
awarded) would go far to removing many of the pathologies and 
perverse economic incentives that plague existing class procedures. 
Whether they go far enough one could debate. Absent acceptance of my 
suggested ex ante requirement of demonstrating the realistic possibility 
of meaningful class-wide relief, I fail to see how the process could be 
deemed acceptable. But of greater importance is this one obvious fact, 
“hidden” in plain sight: the version of the class action Professor 
Fitzpatrick supports does not exist, nor is there any likelihood that it will 
in the foreseeable future. Thus, when Professor Fitzpatrick seeks to 
make the conservative case for the class action, one must wonder 
whether he really means the conservative case for the hypothetical 
reformed class action that he envisions—which, at least for the present 
time, is nothing more than a procedural mirage. 
CONCLUSION: THE DANGER OF RESULT-ORIENTED LIBERALISM  
Many who classify themselves as liberal often measure 
governmental actions solely in terms of results: a government cannot 
be deemed “liberal” unless it has adopted a specific set of programs that 
achieve liberal ends. And I understand how easy it is to focus 
exclusively on whether or not the program being implemented furthers 
one’s own social values. I am even willing to concede that adoption of 
such a political agenda could be deemed a necessary condition of a truly 
liberal society. But the fact that it is a necessary condition, of course, 
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does not mean it is also a sufficient condition. And it most certainly is 
not. As noted at the outset of this Essay, authoritarian imposition of 
“liberal” social programs on an unwilling society amounts to an 
oxymoron: fascist liberalism. At least as necessary an element to any 
truly liberal society is the noun that must follow the adjective 
“liberal”—and that noun is “democracy.”  
As I have shown in this Essay, the modern class action all too 
often (though concededly not always) amounts to a procedural end run 
around the remedial choices adopted in the substantive laws being 
enforced in the class proceeding. If the remedial models adopted 
through the democratic process are to be modified or replaced, it must 
be through the same democratic processes that enacted them in the first 
place, not through a secretive and confusing procedural process of 
alchemy. 
